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RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0947
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SUBJECT: UPDATE ON DARFUR PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT FOR 6
MARCH 2008

REF: USUN 188

Classified By: Colonel Mark Easton for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) SUMMARY: UN Darfur Integrated Operations Team (IOT) informed USUN Military Staff Committee (MSC) rep that at least one TCC is refusing to deploy to alternate locations directed by the UNAMID Force Commander LtGen Agwai. UNAMID plans an air movement exercise to test the GOS-approved procedures in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). END SUMMARY

12. (C) UNAMID Deployment: According to the IOT, all deployment timelines remain valid from the previous week's report (REFTEL). Force Commander (FC) Agwai traveled to Cairo to ask the Egyptians to relocate their infantry battalion from Sector South to Sector West where they are needed more, due to ongoing hostilities in the region. Egypt refused, insisting on deploying to their original location in Nyala, Sector South. (NOTE: this is highly problematic. If TCCs refuse to obey the orders of the FC, UNAMID cannot become a viable operation. TCCs must be willing to be flexible and to obey their chain of command. END NOTE).

13. (C) Force Generation: UN FGS confirmed that there are no new offers for aviation, transport, and logistics units. There has still been no response to the Note Verbales sent out to countries that had indicated they could provide transport units in the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS).

14. (C) Logistics: IOT reported two major areas of concern regarding upcoming deployments.

--First, UNAMID does not have the camp capacity to absorb the approximately 3,600 troops due into Darfur by June 08. Presently, camp construction is not projected to be completed until o/a 15 July 2008. In fact, the Nyala camp is not expected to be complete before the end of the summer.

--Second, the UN is not confident that incoming units will be able to self sustain. Although these units are projected to have the proper equipment, the IOT noted that they will only be capable of performing entry-level preventive maintenance for this equipment, and will likely not be able to perform more advanced and vital types of maintenance. (NOTE: this could create a significant logistical problem for UNAMID, particularly given the incompatibility issues

resulting from a large variance of TCCs and differing types of equipment. END NOTE).

¶5. UNAMID Police Component: According to DPKO, UNAMID individual police officer strength remains at approximately 1567, with another 300 in process. Although member states have pledged police officers, nominations of individual officers for deployment remain extremely low. Unless the situation changes, DPKO estimates that by June they will have no new officers to process for UNAMID, which will result in a critical shortage of individual UNAMID police. The UN has sent note verbales to PCCs requesting their timely contributions of officers, but privately doubt this will result in a surge of nominations. Regarding Formed Police Units (FPUs), DPKO confirmed the Indonesians have withdrawn their pledge of a second FPU .

¶6. (C) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): The IOT reported that UNAMID intends to conduct a series of exercises requiring short notice flights in order to test the responsiveness of aviation assets and to determine if the interface with Sudanese Civil Aviation authorities would hamper movements. In principle, the recently-approved SOFA allows such operations.
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